NetChoice v. Moody by Northern District of Florida
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
TALLAHASSEE DIVISION 
 
NETCHOICE, LLC d/b/a NETCHOICE, a 
501(c)(6) District of Columbia organization; and 
COMPUTER & COMMUNICATIONS 
INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION d/b/a CCIA, a 
501(c)(6) non-stock Virginia corporation, 
 




ASHLEY BROOKE MOODY, in her official 
capacity as Attorney General of the State of 
Florida; JONI ALEXIS POITIER, in her official 
capacity as  Commissioner of the Florida 
Elections Commission; JASON TODD ALLEN, 
in his official capacity as Commissioner of the 
Florida Elections Commission; JOHN MARTIN 
HAYES, in his official capacity as Commissioner 
of the Florida Elections Commission; 
KYMBERLEE CURRY SMITH, in her official 
capacity as Commissioner of the Florida 
Elections Commission; and PATRICK GIL- 
LESPIE, in his official capacity as Deputy 
Secretary of Business Operations of the Florida 
Department of Management Services, 
 




     Civil Action No. 
     4:21-cv-00220-RH-MAF 
BRIEF OF THE REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE 
PRESS, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, AMERICAN CIVIL 
LIBERTIES UNION OF FLORIDA, AUTHORS GUILD INC., CENTER 
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECHNOLOGY, MEDIA LAW RESOURCE 
CENTER, INC., AND PEN AMERICAN CENTER, INC. AS AMICI 
CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY 
INJUNCTION 
 
[Caption continued on next page] 






Deanna K. Shullman (FBN 514462) 
dshullman@shullmanfulgate.com 
Shullman Fugate PLLC 
2101 Vista Parkway, Suite 4006 
West Palm Beach, FL 33411 
Tel: (561) 429-3619 
 
Counsel for amici curiae 
  






The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press is an unincorporated 
association of reporters and editors with no parent corporation and no stock. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) and the American Civil 
Liberties Union of Florida are non-profit entities that do not have parent 
corporations. No publicly held corporation owns 10 percent or more of any stake 
or stock in amici curiae ACLU or ACLU of Florida.  
The Authors Guild Inc. has no parent corporation and no publicly held 
corporation owns 10% or more of its stock. 
The Center for Democracy & Technology has no parent corporation and, 
because it is a non-stock corporation, no publicly held corporation owns 10% or 
more of its stock. 
The Media Law Resource Center has no parent corporation and issues no 
stock. 
PEN American Center, Inc. has no parent or affiliate corporation. 
No party’s counsel has authored this brief, in whole or in part. Furthermore, 
no party or party’s counsel, other than proposed amici, their members, or their 
counsel, has funded the research, writing, preparation, or submission of this brief.  
 
  




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT ............................................................................. iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................. v 
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE .......................................................................... 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 4 
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................ 8 
I. The must-carry provision for political candidates violates First Amendment 
protections for the free flow of information to the public. ..................................... 8 
II. The “journalistic enterprise” carve-out is unconstitutional because it is 








TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Associated Press v. United States,  
 326 U.S. 1 (1945) .................................................................................................... 8 
 
Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm.,  
 412 U.S. 94 (1973) .................................................................................................. 6 
 
e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc.,  
 No. 2:14-cv-646, 2017 WL 2210029 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) ...........................12 
 
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos.,  
 515 U.S. 557 (1995) ....................................................................................... 12, 13 
 
Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc.,  
 10 F. Supp. 3d 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ......................................................... 6, 11, 12 
 
La’Tiejira v. Facebook, Inc.,  
 272 F. Supp. 3d 981 (S.D. Tex. 2017) ..................................................................12 
 
Langdon v. Google, Inc.,  
 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007) ......................................................................13 
 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo,  
 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“Tornillo”)……………………..………….passim 
 
Meyer v. Grant,  
 486 U.S. 414 (1988) ................................................................................................ 8 
 
Mills v. Alabama,  
 384 U.S. 214 (1966) ....................................................................................... 10, 11 
 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan,  
 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ....................................................................................... 10, 13 
 
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States,  








Packingham v. North Carolina,  
 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) ..........................................................................................11 
 
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations,  
 413 U.S. 376 (1973) ................................................................................................ 8 
 
Reno v. ACLU,  
 521 U.S. 844 (1997) ..............................................................................................11 
 
Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc.,  








Anthony Lewis, Nixon and a Right of Reply, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1974, 
https://perma.cc/2W2J-AJ65 ................................................................................... 9 
 
David McCabe, Florida, in a First, Will Fine Social Media Companies That Bar 
Candidates, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/ 
6QM6-N78P ..........................................................................................................10 
 
Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth Estate and the Constitution (1992) ......................... 9 
 
News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of 
Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/ 
5A2C-79ZG ............................................................................................................ 5 
 
Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass Communications (1947) ................ 11, 16 
 
 




INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
The Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press (the “Reporters 
Committee”) is an unincorporated non-profit association. The Reporters 
Committee was founded by leading journalists and media lawyers in 1970 when 
the nation’s news media faced an unprecedented wave of government subpoenas 
forcing reporters to name confidential sources.  Today, its attorneys provide pro 
bono legal representation, amicus curiae support, and other legal resources to 
protect First Amendment freedoms and the newsgathering rights of journalists. 
The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) is a nationwide, non-
partisan, non-profit organization. The ACLU of Florida is a state affiliate of the 
ACLU. Both organizations are dedicated to defending the principles embodied in 
the Constitution and our nation’s civil rights laws and, for decades, have been at 
the forefront of efforts nationwide to protect the full array of civil rights and 
liberties, including freedom of speech and freedom of the press online. The ACLU 
and the ACLU of Florida have frequently appeared before courts throughout the 
country in First Amendment cases, both as direct counsel and as amici curiae.  
The Authors Guild, Inc. was founded in 1912, and is a national non-profit 
association of more than 9,000 professional, published writers of all genres. The 
Guild counts historians, biographers, academicians, journalists and other writers of 
nonfiction and fiction as members. The Guild works to promote the rights and 




professional interests of authors in various areas, including defending their right of 
freedom of expression. Many Guild members earn their livelihoods through their 
writing. Their work covers important issues in history, biography, science, politics, 
medicine, business and other areas; they are frequent contributors to the most 
influential and well-respected publications in every field. 
Center for Democracy & Technology (“CDT”) is a non-profit public interest 
organization. For more than 25 years, CDT has represented the public’s interest in 
an open, decentralized internet and worked to ensure that the constitutional and 
democratic values of free expression and privacy are protected in the digital age. 
CDT regularly advocates in support of the First Amendment and protections for 
online speech before legislatures, regulatory agencies, and courts. 
The Media Law Resource Center, Inc. (“MLRC”) is a non-profit 
professional association for content providers in all media, and for their defense 
lawyers, providing a wide range of resources on media and content law, as well as 
policy issues. These include news and analysis of legal, legislative, and regulatory 
developments; litigation resources and practice guides; and national and 
international media law conferences and meetings. The MLRC also works with its 
membership to respond to legislative and policy proposals and speaks to the press 
and public on media law and First Amendment issues. It counts as members over 
125 media companies, including newspaper, magazine and book publishers, TV 




and radio broadcasters, and digital platforms, and over 200 law firms working in 
the media law field. The MLRC was founded in 1980 by leading American 
publishers and broadcasters to assist in defending and protecting free press rights 
under the First Amendment. 
PEN American Center, Inc. (“PEN America” or “PEN”) is a nonprofit 
organization that represents and advocates for the freedom to write and freedom of 
expression, both in the United States and abroad. PEN America is affiliated with 
more than 100 centers worldwide that comprise the PEN International network. Its 
membership includes more than 7,500 journalists, novelists, poets, essayists, and 
other professionals. PEN America stands at the intersection of journalism, 
literature, and human rights to protect free expression. PEN champions the 
freedom of people everywhere to write, create literature, convey information and 
ideas, and express their views, recognizing the power of the word to transform the 
world. PEN America supports the First Amendment and freedom of expression in 
the United States.  
Amici collectively represent the First Amendment interests of media outlets 
and communication platforms across all technologies and the public’s interest in 
receiving and disseminating information free from government censorship or 
control. Amici submit this brief because they are concerned that S.B. 7072 violates 




fundamental First Amendment rights that animate and preserve robust public 
debate across all media. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
S.B. 7072 compels private communications platforms to carry speech by 
others that they would otherwise not host, and it allows the State to directly 
regulate how private communications platforms curate, edit, or comment on that 
speech. Any law that permits the state to police the content of lawful speech on a 
private communications platform could permit government officials to force 
platforms to carry speech perceived as favorable to the government or to pressure 
platforms to remove speech perceived as unfavorable. S.B. 7072, therefore, vests 
the State of Florida with the pure power of the censor, and it poses an acute threat 
to essential First Amendment protections for the press and public. 
Amici the Reporters Committee, MLRC, and PEN America take no position 
on technology platforms’ content moderation policies or practices; other Amici, 
including the ACLU and CDT, have expressed an array of views on the public 
policy implications of how and when platforms moderate content by public 
officials or others. All Amici are, however, united in their position that the curation 
of lawful content online constitutes an exercise of “editorial control and 
judgment,” which cannot be regulated by the state “consistent with First 




Amendment guarantees.”  Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974) (“Tornillo”). 
Accordingly, Amici write to address the following two points in support of 
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. 
First, government efforts to force online platforms to carry the speech of 
particular speakers, including political candidates, contravene the rule articulated 
by the Supreme Court in Tornillo. Under Tornillo, it is impermissible for the 
government, regardless of motive, to mandate that a private editor “publish that 
which reason tells [it] should not be published.”  Id. at 256 (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Similarly, the danger in a legally enforceable mandate that 
platforms exercise their editorial discretion “consistently” is manifest; it would 
permit the state to control what information flows to the public and when. See id. at 
260 (White, J., concurring) (“[A]ny . . . system that would supplant private control 
of the press with the heavy hand of government intrusion . . . would make the 
government the censor of what the people may read and know.”).  
Here, S.B. 7072 forces online platforms to carry the speech of political 
candidates, and it additionally prohibits them from curating (i.e., prioritizing or 
“shadowbanning”) that speech, or any speech about those candidates. In addition, 
Florida officials have explicitly stated that S.B. 7072’s goal is to address perceived 
bias on platforms. See, e.g., News Release, Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to 




Stop the Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/ 
5A2C-79ZG (“If Big Tech censors enforce rules inconsistently, to discriminate in 
favor of the dominant Silicon Valley ideology, they will now be held 
accountable.”).  
S.B. 7072 violates the First Amendment in that it undermines the necessary 
protections for public discourse established in Tornillo for other forms of media, 
including traditional news organizations. Cf. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. 
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 144–45 (1973) (Stewart, J., concurring) 
(noting concern that requiring broadcast licensees to carry paid editorial 
advertising could erode editorial autonomy of print media). For precisely that 
reason, courts have extended the Tornillo rule—a “virtually insurmountable barrier 
[against] . . . government tampering . . . with news and editorial content,” 418 U.S. 
at 259 (White, J., concurring)—to online communications platforms such as search 
engines and social media, see, e.g., Jian Zhang v. Baidu.com Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 
433, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“In short, Plaintiffs’ efforts to hold [search engine] 
Baidu accountable in a court of law for its editorial judgments about what political 
ideas to promote cannot be squared with the First Amendment.”). By forcing 
communications platforms to carry political speech they otherwise would not, or 
prohibiting platforms from, for instance, adding commentary to third-party posts, 
S.B. 7072 clearly violates the rule articulated in Tornillo.  




Second, S.B. 7072 prohibits platforms from moderating any content from 
“journalistic enterprises,” including entities that publish a certain number of words 
or host a certain number of hours of video online. At first blush, this provision 
could be seen as a salutary protection for the covered entities; yet, if allowed to 
stand, it would in practice gravely injure First Amendment rights. The journalistic 
enterprise provision bars platforms from “edit[ing]” or “post[ing] an addendum to 
any content or material.”  2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32, § 4 (S.B. 7072). 
In other words, the provision itself acts as a prior restraint on a technology 
platform’s own speech. Protections for editing, adding a disclaimer, or similar 
types of speech are central to press freedom, and permitting censorship by the state 
in this manner would significantly erode the rule articulated in Tornillo that has 
been applied to an array of media and expressive activity beyond print in later 
cases. 
For these reasons, Amici respectfully urge the Court to grant Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
  





I. The must-carry provision for political candidates violates First 
Amendment protections for the free flow of information to the public. 
 
Private curation of content online—especially content related to public 
affairs and government officials—is an inextricable component of much modern 
public discourse.1  Such private curation necessarily entails making decisions 
about what material is allowed or disallowed on a platform—including statements 
of or about political candidates. In 1974, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed 
that the First Amendment forbids governmental interference in editorial decisions 
by the print media when it held unconstitutional Florida’s “right of reply” statute, 
 
1  Amici emphasize that the online content regulated under S.B. 7072 is core 
political speech, “an area in which the importance of First Amendment protections 
is at its zenith.”  Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425 (1988) (invalidating Colorado 
prohibition on paid petition circulators as violative of First Amendment) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). The restrictions on moderating political candidates, 
“journalistic enterprises,” and the requirement that moderation policies be applied 
“consistently,” all trench on the ability of communications platforms to lawfully 
curate speech on their platforms, in a manner directly analogous to the right-of-
reply statute in Tornillo. This is not a regulation concerning “a classic example of 
commercial speech,” see Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human 
Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973), nor does it involve the application of a 
generally applicable law like antitrust against a private speaker, see Tornillo, 418 
U.S. at 254 (distinguishing Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), 
and noting that Associated Press Court clarified that district court decree pursuant 
to Sherman Act “does not compel AP or its members to permit publication of 
anything which their ‘reason’ tells them should not be published” (quoting 326 
U.S. at 20 n.18)). Rather, S.B. 7072 directly interferes with the ability of 
communications platforms to present core political speech in the manner that their 
“reason” dictates. 




which “grant[ed] a political candidate a right to equal space to reply to criticism 
and attacks on his record by a newspaper.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 243, 258.  
The Court in Tornillo made clear that government regulation of the “choice 
of material” to include in a newspaper cannot be “exercised consistent with First 
Amendment guarantees.”  Id. at 258. This conclusion applies when such decisions 
deal with the “treatment of public issues and public officials—whether fair or 
unfair.”  Id.  Indeed, press autonomy in decisions “about what and what not to 
publish” has been described as “absolute.”  See Lucas A. Powe, Jr., The Fourth 
Estate and the Constitution 277 (1992) (“Because editorial autonomy is indivisible, 
it must be absolute.”); see also Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 259 (White, J., concurring) 
(“According to our accepted jurisprudence, the First Amendment erects a virtually 
insurmountable barrier between government and the print media so far as 
government tampering, in advance of publication, with news and editorial content 
is concerned.” (citing N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971))).  
Notably, the unanimous Tornillo decision came at the height of fallout from 
Watergate and shortly after a request by President Richard Nixon that the Justice 
Department explore the need for a federal right-of-reply statute because of press 
coverage perceived as critical of public officials in the press. Anthony Lewis, 
Nixon and a Right of Reply, N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1974, at E2, https://perma.cc/ 
2W2J-AJ65 (“Overhanging the debate is the reality of Watergate, where a vigorous 




press broke through repeated official White House denials of wrongdoing.”). 
Today, government actions like S.B. 7072 are being considered and enacted 
against a similar backdrop of claims by politicians that they are being silenced by 
social media companies, and a flood of legislative proposals similar to S.B. 7072 
that are often expressly described as efforts to counter perceived “bias” in content 
moderation practices. David McCabe, Florida, in a First, Will Fine Social Media 
Companies That Bar Candidates, N.Y. Times (May 24, 2021), https://perma.cc/ 
6QM6-N78P (“More than a hundred bills targeting the companies’ moderation 
practices have been filed nationwide this year, according to the National 
Conference of State Legislatures.”). But the Supreme Court has made clear that 
“any . . . compulsion to publish that which reason tells [the press] should not be 
published is unconstitutional.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256 (citation and marks 
omitted). Such laws “operate[ ] as a command in the same sense as a statute or 
regulation forbidding [platforms] to publish specified matter.”  Id. 
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Tornillo emphasized two 
inevitable consequences of permitting the government to mandate access to print 
media. Id. at 254. First, a “[g]overnment-enforced right of access inescapably 
‘dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,’” id. at 257 (quoting 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279), which “of course includes 
discussions of candidates,” id. (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 




(1966)). Second, must-carry provisions “intru[de] into the function of editors,” 
including choices they would otherwise make about “the material to [publish]” and 
“the treatment of public issues and public officials.”  Id. at 258. In other words, an 
enforceable right of access poses the threat of direct press censorship:  “[L]iberty 
of the press is in peril as soon as the government tries to compel what is to go into 
a newspaper.”  Id. at 258 n.24 (quoting Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass 
Communications 633 (1947)). This holds for S.B. 7072, which would rob online 
platforms—and therefore their users—of any choice in whether, and how, to 
publish—or interact with—content by political candidates.  
While the Tornillo Court confronted these issues in the context of print 
media, the Supreme Court has since recognized that the internet as a 
communications medium is entitled to full First Amendment protection. Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997); see also Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. 
Ct. 1730, 1735–36 (2017) (holding unconstitutional a governmental ban on access 
to social media, and finding that “social media users employ these websites to 
engage in a wide array of protected First Amendment activity”). The Court has 
also recognized the application of Tornillo “well beyond the newspaper context,” 
including new communications mediums. Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 437. 
Further, as the Court has since explained, “a private speaker does not forfeit 
constitutional protection simply by combining multifarious voices, or by failing to 




edit their themes to isolate an exact message as the exclusive subject matter of the 
speech.”  Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 
569–70 (1995).    
 Applying those principles, courts have held that online platform decisions 
about what lawful content to host on their sites receive First Amendment 
protection. See Jian Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (holding that, in the context of 
search engine results, the government “may not tell a private speaker what to 
include or not to include in speech about matters of public concern” and 
recognizing that “a search engine’s editorial judgment is much like many other 
familiar editorial judgments, such as the newspaper editor’s judgment of which 
wire-services stories to run and where to place them in the newspaper” (citation 
and marks omitted)); e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. 2:14-cv-646, 
2017 WL 2210029, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“A search engine is akin to a 
publisher, whose judgments about what to publish and what not to publish are 
absolutely protected by the First Amendment.”); Search King, Inc. v. Google 
Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457, 2003 WL 21464568, at *2–4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 
2003) (search rankings are protected opinion). Further, these protections apply 
equally to decisions to remove or exclude content. See, e.g., La’Tiejira v. 
Facebook, Inc., 272 F. Supp. 3d 981, 991 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (holding Facebook 
could decide whether to take down or leave up a post because of “Facebook’s First 




Amendment right to decide what to publish and what not to publish on its 
platform”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629–30 (D. Del. 2007) 
(holding First Amendment right extends to decisions to exclude content from 
search platform). Crucially, these protections apply irrespective of the 
government’s intention in seeking to intervene in these decisions. See Jian Zhang, 
10 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (“Put simply, ‘[d]isapproval of a private speaker’s 
statement’—no matter how justified disapproval may be—‘does not legitimize use 
of the [Government’s] power to compel the speaker to alter the message by 
including one more acceptable to others.’” (quoting Hurley, 515 U.S. at 581)).   
The animating concern in Tornillo—that the power to compel or silence 
speech on a communications medium would allow the government to improperly 
skew public discussion of its policies through mandates, chill, or direct 
suppression—applies when the government seeks to dictate what appears online, 
whether on social media platforms or search engines. Vesting the censorial power 
in the government to interfere with online platforms’ exercise of editorial control 
and judgment is antithetical to the public’s interest in freely receiving and 
disseminating information. Government intrusion into such decisions “dampens the 
vigor and limits the variety of public debate.”  Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 257 (quoting 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964)).  




In short, if a major purpose of the First Amendment is to allow public 
discourse to “serve as a powerful antidote to any abuses of power,” Tornillo, 418 
U.S. at 260 (White, J., concurring) (citation omitted), the First Amendment must 
protect how private actors choose to relay speech by the public and by candidates 
concerning government affairs. S.B. 7072 squarely interferes with the exercise of 
that discretion, and, worse, it does so in an explicit effort to force platforms to 
carry the speech of political candidates and police “bias” online, powers that the 
Tornillo Court categorically denied the government. See id. at 256 (“A responsible 
press is an undoubtedly desirable goal, but press responsibility is not mandated by 
the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be legislated.”).  
II. The “journalistic enterprise” carve-out is unconstitutional because it is 
contrary to Tornillo and impairs newsgathering rights. 
  
S.B. 7072 creates a new Section 501.2041(j) in the Florida Statutes that 
prohibits a “social media platform” from taking any action to “censor, deplatform, 
or shadow ban a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or 
broadcast.”  2021 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 2021-32, § 4 (S.B. 7072). A 
“journalistic enterprise” is defined as an entity doing business in Florida that 
publishes in excess of 100,000 words available online with at least 50,000 paid 
subscribers or 100,000 monthly active users; publishes 100 hours of audio or video 
available online with at least 100 million viewers annually; operates a cable 
channel that provides more than 40 hours of content per week to more than 




100,000 cable subscribers; or holds a broadcast license from the Federal 
Communications Commission. See id. (creating new § 501.2041(d)).  
Taken together, S.B. 7072’s prohibition on “censoring, deplatforming, or 
shadow banning” effectively precludes an affected communications platform from 
moderating any content created by an entity that qualifies under the definition of 
“journalistic enterprise,” including removal of the content for violating platform 
policies or even the addition of commentary by the platform to a post.  
This moderation ban also violates the central principle underpinning 
Tornillo. A news organization must be free to exercise editorial discretion not just 
in terms of what content it decides to publish, but also in terms of how it presents 
that content (by appending disclaimers to advertising, as just one example). 
Likewise, Tornillo makes clear that when a communications platform speaks in its 
own voice by curating or commenting on content on its platform, First Amendment 
protections apply. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258. 
Further, the provision is not saved by its preclusion of “content-based” 
moderation by the platforms (that is, platforms may not moderate based on “the 
content of [the enterprise’s] publication or broadcast”). By purporting to prohibit 
content-based “censorship” by the platform, S.B. 7072 vests the state with the 
power to determine when a platform has engaged in such “censorship,” which 
necessarily turns the state into the censoring party. See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 254 




(“However much validity may be found in the[ ] argument [that fairness and 
accuracy can only be achieved through accountability imposed through 
government action],” if the mechanism used “is governmental coercion, this at 
once brings about a confrontation with the express provisions of the First 
Amendment”). This is because “[a] journal does not merely print observed facts 
the way a cow is photographed through a plateglass window.” Id. at 258 n.24 
(quoting Zechariah Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 633 (1947)). 
Rather, “you have interpretation and you have selection, and editorial selection 
opens the way to editorial suppression.”  Id. In other words, “how can the state 
force abstention from discrimination in the news without dictating selection?”  Id. 
Public officials will be tempted to use that authority to punish moderation 
decisions that they perceive as unfavorable, while ignoring decisions perceived as 
favorable.  That is one of the central dangers identified by the Tornillo Court—the 
government’s ability to skew public discourse in the name of combatting “bias.”  
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256.  As such, this provision, if allowed to stand, poses 
the same risk articulated above; it would weaken Tornillo’s protections for 
everyone, across all media. That violates the First Amendment.  
CONCLUSION 
For all of these reasons, Amici respectfully urge the Court to grant Plaintiffs’ 
motion for a preliminary injunction. 
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